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The Cost of Banking Crises: New Evidence from Life
Satisfaction Data
Alberto Montagnoli and Mirko Moro*
I. INTRODUCTION
The shock of a ﬁnancial crisis imposes a considerable burden on both economies
and individuals. There is an extensive literature on the economic costs and the
channels through which these crises impact the functioning of the ﬁnancial mar-
kets and the real economy via credit disruption and wealth and output losses
(e.g., Bernanke, 1983; Cecchetti et al., 2009). When compared to all other types
of ﬁnancial crises, banking crises are distinctive in that they independently affect
the whole economic system and have both direct (e.g. decrease in GDP and em-
ployment) and indirect (e.g. higher government spending and lower tax revenue)
economic impacts on individuals.1
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1Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) and Kroszner et al. (2007), looking at industrial and sectoral data, ﬁnd that there is
a real cost to banking crises; similarly, using US data from 1866, Giesecke et al. (2014) ﬁnd support to the
theories that emphasize the unique role that banks play in amplifying macroeconomic shocks. Jordà et al.
(2013) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, 2009b, 2011) show that recessions which follow a banking-crisis
are more severe, and the recovery is slower, compared to other types of recessions. The literature has also
highlighted that alongside these aggregate costs there is some evidence that banking crises scar individuals.
For instance Osili and Paulson (2014) show how banking crises change the behaviour of depositors, more
speciﬁcally they show that individuals who have experienced a systemic banking crisis are less likely to
use banks in the U.S. Moreover, corporate managers born during the U.S. Great Depression of the 1930s
are less likely to use external ﬁnancing (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) and are more risk averse (Malmendier
and Nagel, 2011).
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Starting from this premise, the aim of this paper is to test whether banking cri-
ses across Europe had an effect on individual’s life satisfaction.2 To this end, our
framework is built upon the economics of ‘happiness’ (or subjective well-being,
SWB henceforth). This literature has extensively investigated individuals’ SWB
by using surveys, which reliably collect individual life satisfaction or happiness
scores. SWB is typically found to be associated with micro- and macro-economic
factors (e.g., income, job status, unemployment rate) in a predictable fashion (for
reviews see Frey and Stutzer, 2002; MacKerron, 2012). The conclusions of the
seminal papers by Di Tella et al. (2001 and 2003) are particularly relevant to
us; they were the ﬁrst to show a negative association between recessions and
SWB across Europe. More recently, Deaton (2011) analysed the evolution of
daily and monthly measures of SWB (life satisfaction and affect states) in the
United States during the latest crisis.3 His analysis revealed a signiﬁcant drop in
Americans’ life satisfaction and a sharp increase in worry and stress, suggesting
that well-being measures were very successful at capturing uncertainty and fear
about the future. In particular, he points out that the return of SWB to its pre-crisis
levels coincided with the end of the period of uncertainty, as measured by the
Dow Jones trend. This work also shows that the SWB losses in USA followed
by the Great Recession were large, but people fully recovered within two years.
A very similar analysis and conclusion was reached by Graham et al. (2010).4
These papers leave us with a testable hypothesis: banking crises should cause
a distress that would lower SWB above and beyond the psychological losses
caused by changes in objective personal and macroeconomic conditions. We also
explicitly address the potential endogeneity of banking crises and study their per-
sistence in the economy.
We require, therefore, (a) a deﬁnition of banking crises that can discriminate
between crises that impact the population as a whole (not just shareholders or
big investors), and (b) a clear identiﬁcation of the effects of banking crises.
We follow the literature on ﬁnancial stability and the costs of banking crises by
constructing event dummies using datasets from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and
Laeven and Valencia (2013). Speciﬁcally, we focus our attention on crises
2We are aware of the differences in the psychological literature on subjective well-being, happiness and life
satisfaction, but for sake of brevity we will be using them interchangeably throughout the paper.
3Deaton’s (2011) set of measures capture two well-being dimensions. The ﬁrst variable, that Deaton’s label
life evaluation, is also known as the “ladder of life” capture something very similar to our life satisfaction.
People are asked to report whether they are satisﬁed with their life as a whole using a 11-point scale, where 0
is the “worst possible life for you” and 10 is the “best possible life for you”. The second dimension of well-
being is capturing emotions (such as stress, worry, happiness) and it is the yes-no answer to questions about
whether they experienced a lot of each on the previous day. The literature seems to agree that the latter cap-
ture instantaneous utility better.
4Graham et al. (2010) conclude that “people seem to adapt their expectations downward at a time of crisis,
and then are happier with less overall wealth once a sense of hope about an end to the crisis has set in or,
at minimum, that the uncertainty about the downward spiral in the markets/economy has abetted” (p. 730).
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involving commercial banks, hence, excluding those events implicating merchant
banks exclusively.5 We do this because the outcome variable is the well-being of
the whole population rather than some macroeconomic or ﬁnancial outcome.6
We then match these data to individual SWB data extracted from the
Eurobarometer surveys covering an unbalanced panel of twenty-nine European
countries for the period 1980-2011. Our ﬁnal dataset includes ﬁve episodes of
banking crises preceding the great ﬁnancial crash and seventeen crises during
the 2007-08.7
Although unexpected, banking crises may still be endogenous if unobservables
(e.g., level of greed, optimisms, euphoria) are correlatedwith both SWB and ﬁnan-
cial shocks. A simple model regressing SWB on a banking crisis dummy would
implicitly assume that these events are randomly assigned to countries and/or that
there are no omitted variables. In an effort to establish causality between macro-
economic events and well-being we take advantage of the spatial and temporal
variation of crises in our European dataset. This approach can be thought of as a
(dynamic) difference-in-differences (henceforth DD) strategy (see Angrist and
Pischke, 2009).8 Speciﬁcally, we compare the SWB of individuals living in
European countries before and after a banking crisis (i.e., multiple treatment
groups), with individuals living in countries that, in the same period, do not expe-
rience a banking crisis (i.e., multiple control groups). The identifying assumption
is that the SWB of individuals living in countries that did not experience a crisis
form a valid counterfactual for the SWB of individuals living in treatment coun-
tries (after conditioning onmicro andmacro characteristics, country and year ﬁxed
effects). We verify this assumption known as the common trend assumption by
allowing for leads of the banking crisis effects. Statistically similar trends before
the crisis suggest that the control group forms a valid counterfactual. This is also
a placebo test conﬁrming that non-banking crisis years do not lead to a SWB loss
(above and beyond standard economic factors). 9
Our results can be summarised as follows.
5Full information about each crisis episode is reported in Appendix A in the SI.
6It is worth noting that macroeconomic conditions have an impact on the individuals’ SWB, particularly, but
not exclusively, if these conditions are determinants of change in job status. Inﬂation and unemployment
rates are often found to be negatively related to individual life satisfaction, even after controlling for individ-
ual characteristics (see e.g., Blanchﬂower et al., 2014; Di Tella et al., 2001 and 2003; Wolfers, 2003). In our
empirical speciﬁcation, we do control for such a scenario; nevertheless, our focus is on effects that go above
and beyond these standard macroeconomic channels.
7We deliberately stop our sample at 2011 in order to avoid to capture the European debt crisis.
8For similar dynamic DD models in ﬁnance, see e.g., Goetz et al. (2013); Kerr and Nanda (2009). For sim-
plicity, we will refer to this as dynamic DD models in the remainder of the paper.
9We use a sample of individuals living in European countries that share common rules, institutions, markets
and exchange rate regimes in the period covered. We are aware of important differences between the units of
this analysis. Although, a very close similarity between individuals (or countries) is certainly a welcome fea-
ture in a DD framework, the identiﬁcation rests solely on the parallel trend assumption, which we convinc-
ingly satisfy.
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First, we show that banking crises have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
effect on the SWB of Europeans. For these events, we show that the psycholog-
ical losses are highly persistent. We show that these losses are partially explained
by the decline in GDP, wealth losses and ﬁscal costs. However, they extend be-
yond these conventional channels of transmission. The estimated parameters are
also relatively large, about one standard deviation of SWB. We also compute the
trade-off between income and the banking crisis that will leave people, on aver-
age, with the same level of SWB. We estimate that during the ﬁrst year of the
banking crisis, individuals would require an increase in income equivalent to
moving from the ﬁrst to the second income quartile to offset the decline in SWB.
Second, the average coefﬁcient on the 2007-8 crash is estimated to be slightly
smaller than previous banking crises. There are various explanations for this; the
probability of banking crisis contagion is higher in recent years and this reduces
the differences (and hence the detectable effects) between countries that are di-
rectly impacted and the others. In an effort to provide further investigation, we
document that the loss might be larger for those countries that experienced a
credit boom before the crisis started.
Third, we study whether banking crises impact more heavily on some socio-
economic groups. Overall, the results suggest that banking crises has a pro-
nounced impact across all groups.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II highlights the
previous literature on the costs of ﬁnancial, especially banking crises, and the
channels through which banking crises impact well-being. Section III highlights
the empirical strategy. Section IV focuses on the data sets. Section V contains the
results and in Section VI we offer our conclusions.
II. THE COSTS OF BANKING CRISES
There is general agreement that banking crises impose costs on the economy as a
whole that goes beyond direct costs borne by stakeholder, borrowers, depositors
and taxpayers who sustain the ﬁscal burden of the resolution of the crisis. These
general welfare costs have been usually measured in terms of output decline and
are generated by disruption of credit intermediation (Hutchison and Noy, 2005)
and in general a contraction of credit supply via numerous different and self-
reinforcing mechanisms. Cerra and Saxena (2008), employing panel data from
192 countries, ﬁnd strong evidence of a large reduction in economic output. Sim-
ilar evidence is provided by Cecchetti et al. (2009); looking at 40 crises since
1980, their results show sharp and persistent contractions in output. Hoggarth
et al. (2002) suggest that output loss is about 15-20% of annual GDP, on average.
More recently, Jordá et al., (2013) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a; 2009b and
2011), using a sample that spans centuries and several countries, show that bank-
ing crises have a long-lasting effect on both real economic activity and asset
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prices. Reinhart and Rogoff document that unemployment rises, on average, for
ﬁve years with an average rate of seven percentage points. Real GDP per capita
falls by an average of about nine per cent, and the duration of the economic
downturn is two years. Housing and equity markets are severely hit; the decline
is about 35% and 56%, respectively. For instance, Jordá et al. (2013) show that
recessions following a banking-crisis are costlier than other recessions and
Barrell et al. (2006) show that banking crises have a non-negligible effect on
consumption, particularly in the presence of high leverage.
The recent availability of richer longitudinal household surveys has prompted
researchers to attempt to quantify the microeconomic costs of ﬁnancial crises. Par-
ticular emphasis has been placed on the consequence of the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Bricker et al. (2011) conclude that 60% of U.S. households experienced a decline
in wealth between 2007 and 2009, and that about 25% of them lost more than half
of their wealth. Chakrabarti et al. (2011) and Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) show
how these losses have affected large numbers of households across all age, in-
come, and education brackets. Bosworth and Smart (2009) calculate that this loss
was about 20% for households aged over 50. Financial losses were associated with
reductions in consumption, and many households reduced consumption even
without experiencing ﬁnancial losses (e.g. Christelis et al., 2011; Shapiro, 2010).
In addition to these conventional welfare losses, ﬁnancial crises and economic
recessions in general, impose costs that are more difﬁcult to measure but are nev-
ertheless important. These intangible, non-monetary economic disruptions are
linked to a decrease in individuals’mental well-being resulting from increased un-
certainty, fear and a decline in trust of the economic system. For thought-out anal-
yses on this, see Deaton, (2011), Graham et al. (2010), which study daily and
monthly variation in SWB in the United States during the latest ﬁnancial crisis.
Particularly relevant to our paper is their ﬁnding the decline in wellbeing almost
fully recovered by the end of 2010, even though the economy was still
characterised by high unemployment and declining real income, following closely
the stock market. Deaton concludes that the stock market and SWBmeasures were
highly correlated because they were both probably picking up the fear of the future
and uncertainty associated with evolving economic situation. Gathergood (2012),
using longitudinal data from theUK, ﬁnds that problemswithmortgage debt affect
individuals’ mental well-being. Banking crises strongly affect the mutual level of
conﬁdence and trust between ﬁrms, households and banks. Any lack of conﬁdence
created by ﬁnancial crises generates a higher system uncertainty which will ulti-
mately have a negatively impact the level of consumption and investment and
more generally on individuals’ well-being. Related to this, Zingales (2011) shows
a strong relation between the trust that respondents place in banks and their will-
ingness to keep savings in the form of bank deposits.
The next section provides details on how this paper estimates these psycholog-
ical losses using individual SWB data.
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III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The aim of the paper is to estimate the effects of banking crises on SWB across
European countries over time. Simple averages a country level supports the idea
that SWB is lower in the aftermath of a banking crisis (see Appendix B in the
Supplementary Information, hereinafter SI). More formally, we start our analysis
by testing the relationship between SWB and banking crises by OLS in which
SWB is regressed on a banking crisis indicator. The baseline equation at the in-
dividual level is given by:
SWBijt ¼ λt þ αj þ X jtβ þ Z ijtγþ ξDjt þ ϵijt (1)
where i indexes individuals, j indexes nations, and t indexes time. λt and αj are the
year effects and the country ﬁxed effects, respectively. Djt is a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 for the year of a banking crisis and 0 otherwise, Zijt
are individual-speciﬁc covariates, while Xjt accounts for macroeconomic vari-
ables that control for time-varying general characteristics at a country level.
Our hypothesis is that parameter ξ should be negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
This indicates the presence of a correlation between banking crises and SWB.
This parameter ξ equates to the average treatment effect only under the assump-
tions of unconfoundedness (i.e., there are enough controls so that the banking cri-
sis assignment is essentially randomised). A speciﬁc problem here is that the
banking crisis might be correlated with ϵijt because of either omitted or simulta-
neous factors being correlated with both the timing of the banking crisis and life
satisfaction at country-year level; for example, banking crises may occur in coun-
tries that are affected by higher or lower levels of optimism. Variables may be
omitted from even the best dataset, especially at the macro level.
In an effort to develop causal estimates of banking crisis on the individual’s
life satisfaction, and to study whether this effect is persistent we use a dynamic
DD approach. The starting point of this approach is that other things being equal,
one would expect that individuals living in a country hit by a ﬁnancial shock in
year t (i.e., treatment group) are more affected than a comparable group of indi-
viduals living elsewhere after year t, i.e., after the banking crisis occurred. The
identifying assumption is that variations in SWB between treatment and control
groups would have the same trend after the banking crisis, if the banking crisis
did not occur. In a DD setting, this is usually known as the common trend as-
sumption and cannot be veriﬁed. However, a common trend in SWB between
treatment and control groups before the banking crisis is satisfactory evidence
to indicate that banking crises are indeed exogenous.10 A natural way to check
10Our econometric model is complicated by having multiple treatment groups and multiple periods (more-
over, the same treatment group can receive the treatment more than once).
ALBERTO MONTAGNOLI/MIRKO MORO
© 2018 The Authors Kyklos Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd284
for the applicability of the assumption is to allow for leads of the treatment (i.e.
the banking shock). The equation at the individual level is:
SWBijt ¼ λt þ αj þ X jtβ þ Z ijtγþ ∑
q
n¼m
ξnDjt t¼kþnð Þ þ ϵijt (2)
Where ∑
q
n¼m
ξnDjt t¼kþnð Þ is the termof interest; k is the time atwhich the treatment
is being switchedon.Weallow form leads andq lags of the treatment effect. ξn is the
coefﬁcient of interest on the nth lag or lead. ξ0 is then the normalised year corre-
sponding with the beginning of the crisis. ∑
q
n¼0
ξn with q=1,2,3,4 are the parameters
capturing thepersistenceof bankingcrisis. Thebatteryofm leadsprovides evidence
of the common trend assumption. If the control group represents a valid counterfac-
tual,wewould expect that all the coefﬁcients leading to the introduction of the treat-
ment are not statistically different from zero, βn = 0, n < 0. If leads effects are
statistically different from zero, then the future treatmentwould predict current out-
comes, suggesting that banking crises may not be exogenous. Because there is one
crisis everyﬁve years roughly,we present the results using four leads and lagswhen
using the 1980-2003 sample (i.e., every year from ξ4 through ξ+4). For the 2003-
2011 sample, we adopt a model that uses every year from ξ4 to ξ+2.
11
This addition of lags enhances the analysis in two ways: ﬁrst, lagged effects
relax the implicit assumption, common to standard estimators, of constant treat-
ment effects. Furthermore, the addition of lags in equation 2 allows us to study
how long it takes to individuals to adapt to the banking crisis.12
This dynamic framework has been used extensively in the literature to test the
causal impact of policy or shocks rolled out in different states at different times in
Unite States13. We are aware that there are more differences between European
countries than states, but this does not invalidate the use of a DD per se (see,
e.g., Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006 using a DD in a sample of OECD coun-
tries),14 However, European countries in the Eurobarometer share rules, markets,
11In the last case, the reference category is the third and/or fourth lag (ξ+3 and ξ+4, i.e., either 2010 or 2011).
12It is well known that shocks to SWB are temporary, lasting only a few years, after which adaptation is
mostly completed. The literature has documented adaptation to changes in income (Di Tella et al., 2010
and Gardner and Oswald, 2007), and changes in status, e.g., disability (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008),
marriage and divorce (e.g., Clark et al.).
13The number of studies using DD at state level is vast and growing exponentially. For methodologies very
similar to ours, one should check the identiﬁcation strategy based on staggered banking deregulation across
states in the United States, see, e.g., Strahan (2003), Kerr and Nanda (2009), Chava et al. (2013), and more
recently Sun and Yannelis (2016) among many others.
14Having said that there are striking differences across Alabama and California or Massachussets and
Michigan.
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governing institutions and exchange rates regimes in the period of interest. A
very close similarity between units in a difference-in-difference approach is cer-
tainly welcome but ultimately the validity of the approach always relies on com-
mon trends before the shock. Our analysis shows that our sample satisﬁes this
assumption. Setting this aside, the effect of the banking crisis is identiﬁed at
country-year level and one may be concerned about the presence of potential si-
multaneous unobservable country-year factors. Note that the set of leads provide
also a powerful placebo test by showing that non-banking crisis years do not lead
to a SWB loss ruling the existence of confounding factors that may arise inde-
pendently from banking crisis. We cannot rule out that something else might
have happened in the year and in the country every single time that our banking
crisis dummy is turned on. It is however had to imagine that this is not somehow
related to the banking crisis itself. Ultimately, our approach is an improvement
upon running naïve OLS regressions that assumes banking crisis (and in general
events) being uncorrelated with national mood and at minimum can be seen as a
step towards developing causal estimates of macro events.
Another identiﬁcation issue is that banking crises in a country might have
spillovers to other “control” countries. In this sense the control countries “are
contaminated”. In the presence of this contagion, our coefﬁcient might provide
a lower bound of psychological loss, i.e., our strategy provides conservative es-
timates. Note that our estimates tend to be on the lower bound for another aspect.
As we will explain in detail in section IV.2 is very difﬁcult to identify a precise
date as the starting point of a banking crisis. From a technical point of view, at-
tributing the crisis to the whole year instead to a precise date, means that our in-
dicator variables measure the event with an error (some people may have been
interviewed before the manifestation of the episode). This looks like classical
measurement error that would bias the estimates downward.
Following Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), and more generally Angrist
and Pischke (2009), we estimate all our regressions using linear probability
models.15 In all speciﬁcations, we clustered the standard errors at the country
level as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) with improved critical values using
a t-distribution, rather than the normal, to correct for the bias arising from small
clusters (Cameron and Miller, 2015 and Brewer et al., 2013).16
15Angrist and Pischke (2009) show that the linear probability model is the best (linear) approximation for
non-linear conditional expectation functions, whereas Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) demonstrate
that the ordinal nature of happiness scores can be studied by using OLS with empirical examples.
16t- distribution has degrees of freedom equal to the number of clusters minus one. We also estimated stan-
dard errors using the two-way approach of Cameron et al. (2011) to account for dependence across coun-
tries and over the years. The two methods yield very similar errors but we prefer the former as it performs
better when the number of clusters is small. We also estimated the equations using standard errors clustered
at country x year level, which yield smaller standard errors in most of the cases.
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IV. DATA
IV.1. Life satisfaction and individual characteristics
Our main data source is the Eurobarometer Survey Series, a repeated cross-
section survey in which a random sample of Europeans is asked a series of demo-
graphic and socio-economic questions, including one on life satisfaction. These
are conducted twice a year on average and each survey consist of approximately
1,000 face-to-face interviews per country.17 These interviews take place between
March and October each year. The main question of interest is: “On the whole,
are you very satisﬁed, fairly satisﬁed, not very satisﬁed or not at all satisﬁed with
the life you lead?” Answers to the question can be split into four categories.
For the entire sample period, we use samples of individuals living in seventeen
European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Questions are not systemati-
cally asked in all countries each year; hence, technically this is an unbalanced
panel of countries. 18 Since the income variable is dropped from the
Eurobarometer surveys after 2003, we analyse two periods separately: from
1980 to 2003 and from 2003 to 2011. This also implies analysing separately
the Great Recession from the previous episodes which its interesting in its own
way. For this late period, we also include twelve extra countries; these are:
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia (FYROM), Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. There is a dou-
ble reason why we include these countries; ﬁrstly, data were not available before,
but they were all included in the Eurobarometer after 2003 when each country
made formal request to join the EU.19 Second, as we will explain with greater de-
tail the next section, this allows us to expand the control group.
We stop examining in year 2011 because the Great Recession -- initiated by a
housing and banking crisis in the USA -- it later developed into a sovereign debt
crisis in Southern Europe, confounding the effect of the banking crisis.
Finally, each regression includes a set of individual characteristics typically
used in the literature: age, age-squared, dummy variables indicating gender, mar-
ital status (married, single, divorced or separated, widowed), educational attain-
ment (i.e., age-left-school dummies), work status (employed, self-employed,
unemployed), and whether retired, keeping house or a student.
17http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm.
18In particular, we have the following years of data by country: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK (1980-2011); Greece (1981-2011); Portugal, Spain (1986- 2011);
Germany (1992-2011) Austria, Finland, Sweden (1995-2011); Norway (1990-1996, 2001 and 2005);
Iceland (2005, 2010-2011).
19These are the so called candidate countries.
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IV.2. Banking crises
Deﬁning a variable that fully captures the intensity of banking crises is a prob-
lematic task. The ﬁnancial literature does not provide a single deﬁnition of a
banking crisis since banking crises are complex events and proxies might be
imperfectly correlated with the crises themselves (see e.g., Barrell et al.,
2010). As explained in Barrell et al. (2010, p. 3) “The problem lies in the fact
that a banking crisis is an event, so proxies for banking crises would not nec-
essarily be perfectly correlated with banking crises themselves”. If a quantita-
tive candidate variable is found, it is usually not unique, is highly
inconsistent and involves a degree of subjectivity (Kaminsky and Reinhart,
1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). More speciﬁcally, banking
problems can stem both from the liabilities and the assets sides of the banks’
balance sheets. In the former case, a measure for banking insolvency could
be a good proxy; thus, even though a government intervention or deposit insur-
ance schemes could prevent the crisis, the threshold could still be violated.
However, when crises arise from banks’ assets, for instance, problems in asset
quality eroding banking capital, a unique proxy would not pick up all the
events across countries and across time.
For this reason, the ﬁnancial literature relies on databases identifying bank-
ing crisis periods (e.g., specifying the country and year in which the banking
crisis started), compiled on the basis of various criteria.20 The two most recent
and popular databases used are those of Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and
Laeven and Valencia (2013). Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) collected and up-
dated data from a variety of sources, such as Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996,
2003) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Following Reinhart and Rogoff
(2011, p. 1680), a banking crisis is marked “by two types of events: (1) bank
runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one
or more ﬁnancial institutions [...]; and (2) if there are no runs, the closure,
merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important ﬁnan-
cial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of sim-
ilar outcomes for other ﬁnancial institutions [...].” This deﬁnition is very
similar to the one used by Laeven and Valencia (2010, p. 6), who deﬁne a
banking crisis “as systemic if two conditions are met: 1) signiﬁcant signs of
ﬁnancial distress in the banking system (as indicated by signiﬁcant bank runs,
losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations); 2) signiﬁcant banking
20It is extremely difﬁcult to pin-point the exact starting point of a ﬁnancial crisis; this can be seen by looking
at the events that took place in 2007 before the Northern Rock bank-run episode. For instance, on the 7
th
of
February 7, 2007, HSBC announced losses linked to US subprime mortgages. And on June 2007: Two
Bear Stearns-run hedge funds with large holdings of subprime mortgages run into large losses and are
forced to ofﬂoad assets. The trouble transmitted to other ﬁnancial e.g. Merrill Lynch, and Goldman Sachs.
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policy intervention measures in response to signiﬁcant losses in the banking
system.”
Although this latter deﬁnition is very close to that of Reinhart and Rogoff
(2011), it is far more restrictive since it excludes near-systemic crises, hence,
there are very few episodes affecting our sample of countries. Moreover, there
are several notable cases (Italy, 2008; Luxembourg, 2008; Sweden, 2008)
wherein Laeven and Valencia (2013) report a crisis, whereas none are re-
ported by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). Based on the discussion above, we ex-
tract information on both databases to obtain information on banking crises
events.21
The next step is to map these episodes to the Eurobarometer Surveys. Table 1
provides a snapshot of the countries for which we are able to merge life satisfac-
tion data around each banking crisis identiﬁed. There are ﬁve episodes between
1980 and 2003. Given that we have an unbalanced panel of countries – see foot-
note 18 for the full Eurobarometer data coverage– each episode has a different set
of countries as comparison group. Denmark 1987 is compared with ten countries,
21Table A1 in Appendix A (in the SI) describes each banking crisis episode in detail.
Table 1
Banking crises included in the dataset
Countries
Banking crisis years
1984 1987 1990 1991 1994 1995 2000 2007 2008
Austria ✓
Belgium ✓
Denmark ✓ ✓
France ✓ ✓
Germany ✓
Greece ✓ ✓
Spain ✓
Ireland ✓
Italy ✓ ✓
Luxembourg ✓
The Netherlands ✓
Portugal ✓
Sweden ✓
United Kingdom ✓ ✓
Hungary ✓
Slovenia ✓
Notes: The table portrays episodes for which we have life satisfaction data from Eurobarometer Sur-
veys merged with the ﬁrst year of the crisis. The year of the crisis is reported after each country name.
See Table A1 for a more detailed description of each banking crisis episode.
Life satisfaction data are available for this set of countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK (1980-2011); Greece (1981-2011); Portugal, Spain (1986- 2011);
Germany (1992-2011) Austria, Finland, Sweden (1995-2011); Norway (1990-1996, 2001 and
2005); Iceland (2005, 2010-2011); Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia (FYROM), Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania (2004-2011).
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Italy 1990, Greece 1991 and UK 1991 with eleven, France 1994 with twelve.
The global nature of the latest ﬁnancial crisis meant that there we have more
treatment than comparison countries for the 2003-2011 period. As mentioned in
section IV.1, to increase the number of comparison countries and improve the
analysis, we expand the number of countries in the 2003-2011 by including
twelve Eastern European countries that joined the Eurobarometer after 2003.
As a result, we have three banking crisis episodes in 2007 and thirteen in 2008
out of twenty-nine countries. 22
It is important to stress that crises vary in length, and, as reported in Cerra and
Saxena (2008), the end of a crisis is never clearly deﬁned. Our models are able to
resolve this issue by estimating the immediate impact of the crisis as well as its
persistence.23
IV.3. Macroeconomic controls
Some studies examine the relationship between macroeconomic events and indi-
vidual SWB. For instance, Di Tella et al. (2001 and 2003) show that SWB de-
creases when the unemployment rate and inﬂation increase (see also Welsch,
2010 and Blanchﬂower et al., 2014).24 Thus, our ﬁnal dataset comprises a set
of macroeconomic variables typically used to control for time-varying country
effects and, in general, business cycle ﬂuctuations. Data for unemployment,
GDP (at constant 2005 US$) and inﬂation are collected from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI). When the WDI data are missing, we sup-
plement them with data from the Penn World Tables and from the IMF World
Economic Outlook as in Stevenson and Wolfers (2013).
Summary statistics of all the variables discussed in this Section can be found
in Table 2.
22As reported previously, we have discontinuous life satisfaction data for Norway (1990-1996, 2001 and
2005); and Iceland (2005, 2010-2011). This implies that we cannot capture the crisis in Norway in 1987
and Iceland in 2008 (see Table A1). Note also that life satisfaction data for Sweden and Finland starts after
their 1991 crisis (see Table A1 again). In all these cases, we keep these countries in, which implies that
some observations will represent leads or lags when running the dynamic DD (equation 2). In particular,
for Finland and Sweden, surveys are available only for year ξ+4, while for Norway only for ξ+3 and ξ+4.
For Iceland, Eurobarometer surveys are available only for year ξ+3 and ξ+4, and year ξ2.
23A similar approach, albeit in a time-series context and therefore without control groups, is adopted by
Barrell et al. (2010b), who capture the long run impact of banking crises with dummies that take the value
of 0 prior to the crisis and 1 from the time of the crisis onwards.
24Wolfers (2003) found that volatility, and therefore macroeconomic uncertainty, plays a role too. Unemploy-
ment volatility has a pronounced impact on well-being; interestingly, the effects of inﬂation volatility on
well-being are less evident.
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V. RESULTS
We ﬁrst present the results from the linear OLS speciﬁcation in which the effect
of banking crises on SWB is estimated by regressing life satisfaction on a
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Before the 2007-8 ﬁnancial crisis
(1980-2003) N=459,799
2007-8 Financial crisis
(2003-2011) N=530,434
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
SWB (Life satisfaction) 3.05 0.77 2.94 0.82
Occupational status:
Unemployed 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27
Self-employed 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
Retired 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.45
House keeping 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.26
Student 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27
Military 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.27
Income:
First income quartile 0.25 0.43
Second income quartile 0.25 0.43
Third income quartile 0.25 0.43
Fourth income quartile 0.25 0.43
Marital status:
Married 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.48
Single 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.40
Divorced/separated 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27
Widowed 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30
Female 0.51 0.50 0.55 0.50
Age 44.11 17.80 47.89 18.08
Education:
No full-time education 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.08
Still in full-time education 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
Up to 14 years 0.26 0.44 0.13 0.34
15 years 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
16 years 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.27
17 years 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
18 years 0.11 0.31 0.18 0.39
19 years 0.05 0.23 0.09 0.29
20 years 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22
21 years 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19
22 years or older 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.40
Macroeconomic controls
Inﬂation 0.05 0.05 0.028 0.024
Unemployment rate 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.05
Log of GDP 26.84 1.21 26.09 1.62
Notes: Summary statistics for the microeconomic variables, including SWB, and macroeconomic var-
iables. Microeconomic variables are from the Eurobarometer database (1980-2011); deﬁnition of the
variables is provided in the text. Macroeconomic controls are from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI). Log of GDP corresponds to the GDP in constant 2005 US$. When the WDI
data are missing, we supplement them with data from the Penn World Tables and from the IMF World
Economic Outlook. Unemployment rate and inﬂation are calculated as the annual rate of change in the
unemployment and consumer price index, respectively.
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banking crisis dummy, and controlling for a set of micro and macro variables as
presented in equation 2.25
Table 3 shows that the sign on the variable of interest is negative and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the usual level of signiﬁcance in each column.
The ﬁrst two columns report results of naïve regressions (see equation 2). The
next two columns study persistency by augmenting this simple with lags effects
only, while the remaining two columns report estimates from equation 3 – our
favourite model with both lags and leads (pre-trends).
The size and precision of the effect of the banking crisis in the ﬁrst year
slightly increase when including lags (column 3 and 4) and controlling for pre-
trends (e.g., leads in column 5 and 6), hinting that omitted variables may bias
the relationship downward. However, note that there is not statistical difference
between coefﬁcients. This SWB decline is identiﬁed after controlling for individ-
ual and macroeconomic conditions such as income, job status, GDP, unemploy-
ment and the inﬂation rate. This implies that there are non-negligible costs
associated with the banking crisis.26 We discuss the mechanisms that may be re-
sponsible for these results in the next Section.
When considering our preferred speciﬁcations in the last two columns, the
magnitude of the coefﬁcient ξ0, is equivalent to more than one standard deviation
of SWB for the period 1980-2003, and slightly less for the period 2003-2009. We
compare the negative coefﬁcient of 0.102 and 0.068 in the ﬁrst year of the crisis
with the size of other coefﬁcients in the same regression in order to put these
ﬁndings into a broader context. Estimates for the 1980-2003 period include
household income as a covariate, so what about the trade-off between household
income and banking crisis? Considering that the coefﬁcient on the second in-
come quartile is about 0.1 (and that the ﬁrst income quartile is the reference cat-
egory), a move from the ﬁrst to the second income quartile would be required to
keep happiness constant during the year of the crisis. These examples clearly
show that the coefﬁcient is measuring a substantial loss in well-being.
When we examine the recent ﬁnancial crisis, we note that the estimated
banking crisis parameters are smaller than perhaps expected. There are various
plausible explanations for this result. The ﬁrst reason is that ﬁnancial globaliza-
tion and the introduction of the euro have led to the development of a highly
interconnected banking industry.27 Hence, we do not ﬁnd a strong impact from
25To save space, we do not report the estimates of our numerous control variables. They are in line with pre-
vious research and do not differ at all from past studies which use the same data source. SWB is higher for
female, married individuals and, among labour market status, for students; it is U-shaped in age; being un-
employed is associated with lower SWB. Higher income groups report higher SWB. The macroeconomic
variables have the usual sign; however they are not always statistically signiﬁcant. These results are avail-
able upon request.
26Table A2 presents similar analysis when all banking crises are included.
27Starting from the late 1990s, banks took advantage of cross-border openness to exploit economies of scale.
See Claessens et al. (2010) and Allen et al. (2011) for a discussion.
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Table 3
The impact and persistency of banking crises on subjective wellbeing across Europe
Before the 2007-8
ﬁnancial crisis
2007-8
Financial crisis
Before the 2007-8
ﬁnancial crisis
2007-8
Financial crisis
Before the 2007-8
ﬁnancial crisis
2007-8
Financial crisis
Sample period (1980-2003) (2003-2011) (1980-2003) (2003-2011) (1980-2003) (2003-2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Banking crisis (ξ0) -0.073
** (0.030) -0.032** (0.014) -0.091** (0.039) -0.052*** (0.016) -0.102** (0.041) -0.068** (0.029)
+ 1 year (ξ+1) -0.089 (0.057) -0.057
** (0.024) -0.096 (0.056) -0.069** (0.030)
+2 years (ξ+2) -0.068
** (0.024) -0.008 (0.024) -0.074*** (0.023) -0.018 (0.022)
+ 3 years (ξ+3) -0.045 (0.027) -0.052
* (0.027)
+ 4 years (ξ+4) -0.041
* (0.023) -0.048** (0.020)
- 4 year (ξ4) -0.013 (0.019) -0.024 (0.025)
-3 years (ξ3) -0.042 (0.026) 0.008 (0.032)
-2 years (ξ2) -0.012 (0.019) -0.006 (0.027)
- 1 year (ξ1) -0.022 (0.021) -0.038 (0.025)
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household income Yes No Yes No Yes No
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-trends (leads) No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 459,799 530,434 459,799 530,434 459,799 530,434
R-squared 0.188 0.275 0.188 0.276 0.188 0.276
Notes: Each column reports coefﬁcients from separate OLS regressions, corresponding to equation 1 (columns 1 and 2), equation 2 (columns 3, 4, 5 and 6). The
dependent variable is individual SWB. Independent variables include: the reported banking crisis indicators measuring the impact of the crisis in the year of the crisis
(ξ0) and in each of the four years after (from column 3 to 6). The last two columns control for, and reports, SWB trends (pre-trends) up to four years before the crisis.
Macroeconomic controls include log of GDP, inﬂation and unemployment rate at country level; country and year ﬁxed effects; and a set of individual characteristics,
which include gender, age and age-squared, indicators of marital status, education and a complete set of employment status dummy variables. Household income is
included when speciﬁed in the table. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at country level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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the 2008 ﬁnancial crash since all countries in our sample have been hit to some
extent by the ﬁnancial or economic turmoil. This reduces the differences (and
hence the detectable effects) between countries that are directly impacted and
the others. Note that also the absence of income as control variable after
2003 could be put forward as a reason for this result. If income losses are pos-
itively correlated with the banking crisis and SWB, then, the omission of in-
come quartiles may lead to an overestimation of the effect of the banking
crisis. In order to check this potential bias, we run a speciﬁcation for the
1980-2003 sample excluding household income; the size of the banking crisis
dummy is larger when income quartiles are controlled for.28 Assuming that the
same is true for the more recent ﬁnancial event, a happiness regression estima-
tion carried out without controlling for income quartiles – as we are forced to
do for the other samples due to data availability –represents a conservative es-
timate of the latest banking crisis.
Focussing on persistency, there is evidence of lagged effect of the crises
prior to 2007-8, while the negative effects are smaller for the most recent
ﬁnancial crisis. The speciﬁcations estimated in column 5 and 6 -- with
full set of leads and lags -- offer stronger evidence of psychological losses
going beyond the ﬁrst year of the crisis. The impact of a banking crisis is
highly persistent and is at least twice the length of the average GDP drop
found in other studies (e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a and 2009b). This
would suggest that banking crisis may affect SWB over and above negative
growth.
Models in column 5 and 6 are not only richer of controls, but the inclusion
of pre-trends provide a direct test for the identifying assumption behind the
empirical strategy – trends in SWB being similar across individuals before
the crisis. Figure 1 provides a graphical analysis of this by showing that the
banking dummy variables are not signiﬁcantly different from zero for all years
before the crisis.29 There is no statistically signiﬁcant difference in SWB before
the event either in countries affected by the crisis or in those that are not
affected. We take this as an indication that countries spared from the crisis
represent a good counterfactual. In other words, conditioning on our set of
covariates and including pre-trends, banking crises are exogenous shocks
with respect to SWB. As mentioned already, this offers also a placebo test,
as we can check how SWB behaves in non-banking crisis years. Our analysis
clearly shows that SWB declines only after the crisis in the countries affected
by it.
28See Table A3 in the SI.
29Pre-crisis trend coefﬁcients are not reported here, but they are available upon request.
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V.3. Further robustness Checks: Channels
We have shown that banking crises generate a loss of well-being that goes be-
yond that generated by changes in individual and macroeconomic factors such
as inﬂation, unemployment rates and log of GDP within year and countries. In
Section II we have reported a variety of other channels through which banking
crises may affect individuals’ SWB. These could be grouped into three sets: eco-
nomic recessions, ﬁscal and wealth losses. Disentangling the structural relation-
ships between these variables would require a number of ad hoc identifying
assumptions and a structural model; this goes beyond the scope of this work.
Hence, in this sub-section, we focus on additional controls that may explain
the decline in SWB that follows banking crises.
It is well documented that banking crises are accompanied by economic reces-
sions when looking at recent times (e.g., Cecchetti et al., 2009) or over centuries
(e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 2009a). Although our speciﬁcations include a variety
of factors that already captures negative economic changes (such as unemploy-
ment rates with country and ﬁxed effects), it is therefore instructive to include
changes in GDP directly, rather than its level. This should be able to capture
whether the decline in SWB can be entirely attributed to a decline in economic
growth. We label this the economic growth channel.
Figure 1
Subjective wellbeing trends before and after the crisis. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Since banking crises are complex ﬁnancial situations that may result in overall
ﬁnancial and economic instability, governments are prone to intervene promptly
and directly when a crisis hit. This intervention could have some tangible reper-
cussions both on the overall economy and the individuals’ SWB. For instance,
direct intervention to rescue ﬁnancial institutions could create ﬁscal constraints
for a government that is bound by budgetary regulations. The result could be ei-
ther a decrease in government expenditures and/or an increase in the tax burden.
Moreover, if we accept the Ricardian equivalence postulate, households may re-
duce their current consumption in the expectation of future increases in taxation.
All these factors would have direct and indirect impacts on individuals’ income
and ultimately on their welfare and well-being.30
Beyond the ﬁscal channel, SWB may change via the wealth channel. One of
the consequences of a banking crisis is turmoil in stock markets; Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009b), for example, ﬁnd that equity markets experience an average
drop of 55%. This sharp and prolonged decline is associated with a loss in
wealth, both at the institutional level (e.g., pension funds) and the individual
level (e.g., savings) and consequently, an individual’s SWB.31
We therefore test the hypothesis of a link between banking crises andSWBby re-
estimating equation 2 in order to include changes inGDP, government intervention
(consumption and level of taxation) and via a wealth effect (proxied by a decline in
the stockmarket).32 If one of these channels is veriﬁedwe expect the banking crisis
dummy indicators to become smaller and to lose statistical signiﬁcance. 33
Table 4 shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of other
macroeconomic variables. The coefﬁcients get slightly smaller in size and lose
precision. We take this as evidence that banking crises are accompanied by a de-
cline in economic output and wealth and ﬁscal changes that affects happiness.
However, the estimated coefﬁcients are still statistically signiﬁcant at the usual
level of conﬁdence and large: non-negligible loss of wellbeing equal to one stan-
dard deviation.34 In light of these estimates, and the evidence presented above,
30Hessami (2010) presents evidence on the link between government expenditure and SWB. See also Di
Tella and MacCulloch (2006)
31An indirect wealth channel is also taken into account by controlling for inﬂation. In fact, a higher inﬂation
rate leads to a redistribution of wealth between borrowers and lenders.
32The housing market is also part of the wealth channel, however given the data limitation, we include it only
in the next section, when we investigate the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
33Government consumption and tax burdens are normalized by GDP. Total tax burden is estimated excluding
imputed social security contributions and reported as a percentage of GDP at market prices. We take these
data from the AMECO database of the European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁnance/
ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm). Data on stock markets is computed based on the share price index for
each country as provided by the Reuters Thomson Datastream database.
34We also experimented with the inclusion of positive and negative growth since SWB may respond asym-
metrically as suggested in De Neve et al. (2015). The results are reported in the SI, Appendix A, Table A4.
The response of SWB to a banking crisis is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results presented
in the previous tables. We thank a referee for this point.
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Table 4
Is the effect of banking crisis robust to the inclusion of economic, ﬁscal and wealth losses?
Sample period 1980-2003 Sample period 2003-2011
Event years ξn (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
-4 years -0.021
(0.019)
-0.011
(0.022)
-0.010
(0.024)
0.010
(0.027)
0.008
(0.027)
0.008
(0.024)
0.006
(0.026)
0.000
(0.027)
-0.033
(0.032)
0.042
(0.032)
0.022
(0.022)
-3 years -0.047*
(0.025)
-0.032
(0.030)
-0.031
(0.032)
-0.008
(0.031)
-0.012
(0.035)
0.039
(0.034)
0.043
(0.035)
0.034
(0.036)
-0.005
(0.042)
0.047
(0.037)
0.026
(0.031)
-2 years -0.003
(0.016)
-0.001
(0.030)
0.001
(0.031)
-0.032
(0.022)
-0.029
(0.020)
0.017
(0.028)
0.025
(0.029)
0.016
(0.030)
-0.017
(0.041)
0.048
(0.035)
0.024
(0.043)
-1 year -0.026
(0.018)
-0.020
(0.035)
-0.016
(0.031)
-0.007
(0.041)
-0.010
(0.043)
-0.024
(0.026)
-0.015
(0.026)
-0.023
(0.028)
-0.048
(0.041)
0.007
(0.025)
-0.011
(0.034)
Banking crisis (ξ0) -0.077
*
(0.040)
-0.078**
(0.030)
-0.074***
(0.024)
-0.052***
(0.017)
-0.058*
(0.032)
-0.064**
(0.032)
-0.052*
(0.030)
-0.060*
(0.033)
-0.086*
(0.044)
-0.034
(0.029)
-0.058*
(0.034)
+1 year -0.066
(0.055)
-0.059
(0.036)
-0.057
(0.036)
-0.065
(0.040)
-0.058
(0.038)
-0.079**
(0.034)
-0.063*
(0.032)
-0.068**
(0.033)
-0.092**
(0.041)
-0.061*
(0.032)
-0.076**
(0.036)
+2 years -0.060**
(0.024)
-0.068***
(0.019)
-0.065***
(0.017)
-0.056**
(0.022)
-0.058***
(0.020)
-0.026
(0.023)
-0.016
(0.022)
-0.018
(0.023)
-0.030
(0.031)
-0.026
(0.019)
-0.047*
(0.024)
+3 years -0.065
(0.038)
-0.072**
(0.028)
-0.072**
(0.031)
-0.073*
(0.036)
-0.067**
(0.031)
+4 years -0.041**
(0.014)
-0.056***
(0.015)
-0.056***
(0.015)
-0.044**
(0.016)
-0.052**
(0.025)
Observations 633,687 583,560 583,560 552,822 527,673 530,434 507,627 507,627 426,252 436,707 372,493
R-squared 0.164 0.171 0.171 0.168 0.173 0.276 0.282 0.282 0.291 0.279 0.283
Channels controlled for:
GDP growth Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes
Government
consumption
No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
Tax burden No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Annual stock market
returns
No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes
(Continues)
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Table 4. (Continued)
Sample period 1980-2003 Sample period 2003-2011
Event years ξn (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
House prices growth No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Further controls:
Macroeconomic
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual
characteristics
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column reports coefﬁcients from separate OLS regressions, corresponding to equation 2, in which individual SWB is regressed on the banking crisis
indicators measuring the impact of the crisis in the year of the crisis (ξ0) and in each of the four years before (pre-treatments) and after (post-treatments). Additional
variables that represent economic, ﬁscal and wealth channels are included. These are annual GDP growth, government consumption, tax burden, annual stock market
returns and annual house price change. Each regression also includes country and year ﬁxed effects, inﬂation and unemployment rate and a set of individual charac-
teristics, which include gender, age and age-squared, indicators of marital status, education and a complete set of employment status dummy variables. Data on house
prices are from the Bank of International Settlements (http://www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm)Standard errors in parenthesis are adjusted for clustering at country level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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we suggest that there is a “residual effect” that is hard to capture; a psychological
effect of banking crises that is not accounted for in traditional economic stud-
ies.35 This non-monetary effect could involve fear and distress and a deep failure
of trust caused by banking crises, such as trust in ﬁnancial institutions or trust in
political/regulatory institutions. These effects might well be picked up by our
SWB variable. Evidence of this can be found in Ehrmann et al. (2013). They an-
alyse how trust in the European Central Bank (and other European Institutions)
evolved around the great recession of 2007-8 and show that there is a decline
across European countries, which is in line with our ﬁndings.
V.4. The role of the credit boom
The current ﬁnancial crisis began during 2007-8 when ﬁnancial stability replaced
inﬂation as central banks’ main concern. The roots of the crisis go back much
further, and there are many views on the fundamental causes including imprudent
mortgage lending, deregulatory legislation, credit default swaps, fragmented reg-
ulation, and lack of a systemic risk regulator. One of the most important and dis-
tinctive elements of the current crisis lies in the nature of the so-called credit
cycle (Kindleberger, 1978, Minsky, 1982 and more recently Borio, 2012). The
term describes the tendency of the ﬁnancial system to excessively increase its
credit supply during the upswing and to strongly cut down lending during reces-
sions (when everybody tries to evade risk). Several authors (e.g., Lindsey, 2007)
have documented the similarities between the recent boom–bust pattern and ear-
lier episodes, recently Mian and Suﬁ (2014) highlighted how the rise in house-
hold debt preceding the crisis that led to a big decline in spending, real output
and a large rise in unemployment. In our context, the hypothesis is that when
the credit ﬂow halted in 2007-2008, individuals living in countries that experi-
enced a credit boom (which is countries whose economies relied the most on
consumption based on credit) suffered a higher loss than countries where the
credit market did not expand too rapidly. We proceed by deﬁning a credit boom
indicator. Speciﬁcally, we use two separate deﬁnitions, ﬁrst we employ the meth-
odology suggested by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012); for robustness we also use the
deﬁnition provided by Mendoza and Terrones (2012).
The results are presented in Table 5. This models control for GDP growth,
stock market returns and ﬁscal variables, such as the tax burden and govern-
ment consumption. We ﬁnd that the average loss in well-being is much more
pronounced and persistent across those countries which experienced a credit
boom when using Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012). The loss in SWB is the largest
35One may conjecture that SWB losses could be a consequence of a reduction in physical health. However
reasonable this may appear, the bulk of the literature clearly shows that health actually improves when
the macro economy worsens (for a recent review see Ruhm (2006) or Adda et al. (2009)).
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observed, equal to two standard deviations of SWB and persisted for the two
periods. Two years after the coefﬁcient is large but not statistically signiﬁcant.
The results here have great policy implications; they lend support to the view
that ﬁnancial stability should be at least as important as monetary stability.
However, these ﬁndings are not replicated when using Mendoza and Terrones’
(2012) deﬁnition of credit boom. The effects are always negative but very sim-
ilar and their standard errors are larger. Overall we take this as evidence that
there might be some differences between countries with credit boom, but the
evidence is not too strong.
V.5. Heterogeneity
The above results indicate that, on average, banking crises have a deep and
prolonged effect on the SWB of individuals across Europe. A potential issue with
the pooled regressions presented above is that they might conceal heterogeneity
between groups of individuals. Hence it is important to understand whether
banking crises have had any distributional psychological cost. We focus our
Table 5
Subjective wellbeing losses from banking crises preceded (or not) by a credit boom
Credit boom deﬁnition
Ariccia et al. (2012) Mendoza and Terrones (2012)
Event years ξn No credit boom Credit boom No credit boom Credit boom
-4 years -0.013
(0.058)
-0.025
(0.014)
-0.010
(0.025)
-0.064*
(0.030)
-3 years 0.062
(0.072)
-0.019*
(0.009)
0.030
(0.045)
-0.029
(0.059)
-2 years 0.032
(0.054)
-0.039
(0.036)
-0.009
(0.040)
-0.027
(0.082)
-1 year -0.030
(0.034)
-0.062
(0.058)
-0.027
(0.031)
-0.046
(0.071)
Banking crisis -0.041
(0.043)
-0.118*
(0.062)
-0.056
(0.035)
-0.068
(0.073)
+1 year 0.006
(0.030)
-0.164***
(0.046)
-0.070
(0.045)
-0.063
(0.048)
+2 years 0.061
(0.055)
-0.089**
(0.032)
-0.008
(0.031)
-0.055**
(0.022)
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 238,807 187,445 267,226 159,026
R-squared 0.319 0.241 0.337 0.198
Notes: Each column shows estimated coefﬁcients from OLS regressions by sub-groups in which SWB
is regressed on the banking crises leads and lags (see equation 2). The sample period for the estimation
is 2003-2011. Further controls are country and year ﬁxed effects, macroeconomic variables (inﬂation
and unemployment rate, GDP growth, government consumption, tax burden, annual stock market
returns, house prices growth), individual characteristics, which include household income, gender,
age and age-squared, indicators of marital status, education and a complete set of employment status
dummy variables. Boom period are deﬁned as in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) and Mendoza and Terrones
(2012). Standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level are in parentheses, ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 6
Heterogeneity of the effect of banking crises on subjective wellbeing
Sample period 1980-2003
…by age groups (quintiles) …by gender …by job status
Event
years ξn
(13-27) (28-38) (39-50) (51-63) (64-99) Male Female Employed Unemployed Self Retired
-4 years -0.012(0.023)
-0.009
(0.035)
-0.032
(0.020)
0.018
(0.023)
-0.029
(0.032)
-0.026
(0.020)
-0.001
(0.019)
-0.001
(0.018)
-0.030
(0.052)
-0.061*
(0.031)
-0.023
(0.032)
-3 years -0.073(0.043)
-0.027
(0.035)
-0.044*
(0.023)
-0.034
(0.026)
-0.023
(0.020)
-0.060*
(0.034)
-0.030
(0.027)
-0.046
(0.033)
-0.012
(0.064)
-0.075**
(0.035)
-0.030
(0.028)
-2 years -0.032
*
(0.018)
0.004
(0.031)
0.008
(0.026)
0.006
(0.031)
-0.047*
(0.023)
-0.016
(0.016)
-0.013
(0.023)
-0.013
(0.021)
-0.013
(0.034)
0.052
(0.041)
-0.041*
(0.021)
-1 year 0.009(0.026)
-0.016
(0.021)
-0.018
(0.035)
-0.036
(0.026)
-0.048*
(0.026)
-0.031
(0.022)
-0.015
(0.021)
-0.020
(0.027)
-0.022
(0.053)
-0.052
(0.043)
-0.036*
(0.021)
Banking crisis -0.057(0.039)
-0.108***
(0.030)
-0.103*
(0.051)
-0.132**
(0.059)
-0.106
(0.067)
-0.103**
(0.042)
-0.100**
(0.042)
-0.066**
(0.030)
0.035
(0.055)
-0.179***
(0.056)
-0.106*
(0.055)
+1 year -0.067(0.045)
-0.082*
(0.047)
-0.095
(0.056)
-0.142**
(0.057)
-0.096
(0.069)
-0.094*
(0.051)
-0.099
(0.061)
-0.073*
(0.039)
-0.074*
(0.038)
-0.116**
(0.052)
-0.096
(0.063)
+ 2 years -0.059
***
(0.020)
-0.076**
(0.027)
-0.080**
(0.029)
-0.066*
(0.037)
-0.076***
(0.026)
-0.079***
(0.023)
-0.073***
(0.024)
-0.071***
(0.020)
-0.094***
(0.022)
-0.089
(0.052)
-0.062**
(0.022)
+3 years -0.013(0.023)
-0.052**
(0.024)
-0.073
(0.043)
-0.057*
(0.030)
-0.061*
(0.034)
-0.050**
(0.020)
-0.054
(0.033)
-0.033
(0.024)
-0.103**
(0.049)
-0.099**
(0.039)
-0.047
(0.032)
+4 years -0.001(0.019)
-0.045*
(0.025)
-0.077**
(0.026)
-0.045
(0.048)
-0.081**
(0.032)
-0.025
(0.027)
-0.075***
(0.017)
-0.036**
(0.015)
-0.073
(0.066)
-0.036
(0.032)
-0.070**
(0.027)
Observations 100,010 102,746 91,001 82,316 83,726 225,357 236,227 201,005 30,649 37,434 92,280
R-squared 0.168 0.198 0.206 0.202 0.192 0.179 0.190 0.178 0.160 0.173 0.181
(Continues)
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Table 6. (Continued)
Sample period 2003-2011
…by age groups (quintiles) …by gender …by job status
Event years ξn (13-27) (28-38) (39-50) (51-63) (64-99) Male Female Employed Unemployed Self Retired
-4 years 0.027(0.024)
0.001
(0.023)
-0.046
(0.033)
-0.038
(0.030)
-0.021
(0.038)
-0.032
(0.029)
-0.017
(0.023)
-0.021
(0.024)
-0.003
(0.038)
-0.054*
(0.031)
-0.025
(0.034)
-3 years 0.012(0.036)
0.021
(0.033)
0.009
(0.036)
0.003
(0.035)
0.031
(0.046)
-0.006
(0.034)
0.020
(0.031)
0.004
(0.031)
0.007
(0.052)
-0.021
(0.032)
0.028
(0.040)
-2 years 0.007(0.034)
0.012
(0.032)
-0.002
(0.032)
-0.008
(0.034)
-0.007
(0.028)
-0.003
(0.027)
-0.006
(0.028)
-0.003
(0.028)
0.006
(0.039)
0.025
(0.037)
-0.008
(0.027)
-1 year -0.011(0.031)
-0.032
(0.021)
-0.047
(0.031)
-0.025
(0.027)
-0.054*
(0.031)
-0.038
(0.024)
-0.039
(0.027)
-0.029
(0.024)
-0.013
(0.052)
-0.025
(0.039)
-0.058*
(0.033)
Banking crisis -0.046(0.027)
-0.081**
(0.033)
-0.066*
(0.034)
-0.060*
(0.030)
-0.066**
(0.031)
-0.056*
(0.030)
-0.078**
(0.029)
-0.062**
(0.028)
-0.066
(0.041)
-0.073
(0.049)
-0.068**
(0.032)
+1 year -0.053(0.036)
-0.071**
(0.031)
-0.068**
(0.030)
-0.057*
(0.029)
-0.081**
(0.037)
-0.076**
(0.031)
-0.064**
(0.031)
-0.061**
(0.027)
-0.083*
(0.049)
-0.077*
(0.046)
-0.064*
(0.033)
+ 2 years -0.010(0.028)
-0.024
(0.024)
-0.019
(0.024)
0.002
(0.021)
-0.027
(0.020)
-0.010
(0.023)
-0.024
(0.021)
-0.019
(0.023)
0.004
(0.035)
-0.001
(0.033)
-0.018
(0.021)
Observations 84,664 96,494 111,348 115,749 122,179 238,593 291,841 219,191 41,302 38,240 150,922
R-squared 0.191 0.262 0.295 0.306 0.309 0.278 0.275 0.257 0.220 0.226 0.293
(Continues)
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Table 6. (Continued)
sample period 1980-2003)
…by income quartiles
Event years ξn First Second Third Fourth
-4 years -0.021(0.033)
0.016
(0.017)
-0.010
(0.025)
-0.030
(0.019)
-3 years -0.040(0.035)
-0.022
(0.024)
-0.049
(0.037)
-0.068**
(0.030)
-2 years -0.026(0.037)
-0.010
(0.018)
-0.029
(0.025)
0.014
(0.016)
-1 year -0.029(0.022)
-0.029
(0.033)
-0.019
(0.027)
-0.012
(0.017)
Banking crisis -0.091
*
(0.046)
-0.112**
(0.047)
-0.121**
(0.047)
-0.077*
(0.038)
+1 year -0.117
**
(0.053)
-0.151*
(0.082)
-0.077
(0.050)
-0.037
(0.043)
+ 2 years -0.089
***
(0.023)
-0.076***
(0.024)
-0.056*
(0.028)
-0.075**
(0.026)
+3 years -0.067
**
(0.026)
-0.051*
(0.028)
-0.066*
(0.037)
-0.018
(0.028)
+4 years -0.093
***
(0.021)
-0.030
(0.027)
-0.036
(0.023)
-0.048
(0.032)
Observations 115,354 115,307 116,217 114,706
R-squared 0.173 0.159 0.158 0.158
Notes: Each column shows estimated coefﬁcients from OLS regressions by sub-groups in which SWB is regressed on the banking crises leads and lags
(see equation 2). Further controls are country and year ﬁxed effects, macroeconomic variables
(log of GDP, inﬂation and unemployment rate), individual characteristics, which include household income, gender, age and age-squared, indicators of marital status,
education and a complete set of employment status dummy variables. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level are in parentheses, ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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attention, therefore, on the degree of heterogeneity of the response of SWB to a
banking crisis across socio-economic groups. We do this by investigating the dy-
namics of the leads and lags within individuals’ socio-economic characteristics.
In particular, we study the effect of a crisis across marital status, gender, income
quartiles and labour market status.36 This provides us with a direct test of
whether a banking crisis affects some groups more than others.
We run separate regressions for each set of social or demographic indicators: in-
come quartiles, gender, education and employment status. For instance, when
studying heterogeneous effects across labour market status we run separate regres-
sion for each economic group.37What is striking in the results reported in Table 6
is the similarity of the size and statistical signiﬁcance of coefﬁcients across groups;
for instance if we look at males and females the impact during the year of the crises
is 0.103 and 0.100 in absolute value for the ﬁrst period and 0.056 and 0.078, re-
spectively, for the most recent period. When looking across income groups, again
we cannot reject the hypothesis that banking crises have a similar impact across
groups. This equality of treatments is conﬁrmed for the period 1980-2003 and post
2003. There are no particular reasons to believe that, after conditioning on our rich
set of characteristics, SWB losses are more pronounced for the lower income
groups. Moreover, the analysis does not ﬁnd strong evidence that unemployed
people are more affected than employed and retired individuals.38
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the impact of
banking crises on SWB in Europe for the period 1980-2011.
We do this by combining databases of banking crisis events, compiled by the
ﬁnancial stability literature over the last three decades and updated by Reinhart
and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia (2013), with the Eurobarometer sur-
veys. Since endogeneity can be quite severe, this paper utilizes difference-in-
differences techniques to address potential bias.
Overall, our results strongly suggest that ﬁnancial crises add a non-negligible
cost to individual well-being, above and beyond that which can be attributed to
losses of personal income, job and GDP and increasing inﬂation and unemploy-
ment rates. Because of differences in the surveys, we analyse separately two pe-
riods, 1980-2003 and 2003-2011.
For the crises before 2007, these costs appear to last for at four years after the
crisis and are relatively large. The SWB loss in the ﬁrst year of the crisis is
36Given the nature of the data the analysis on income quantile is done only for the period pre-2003.
37We also run regressions where we estimate the triple interaction between leads, lags and the individual
characteristic of interest; results, not reported here but available upon request, show that the impact is sta-
tistically similar across groups.
38Working from home and being a student are not shown. Results are available upon request.
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equivalent to a decrease by one standard deviation. A change in income equiva-
lent to moving somebody from the ﬁrst to the second income quartile is required
to hold SWB constant in the ﬁrst year of the crisis. The effect becomes smaller,
but SWB never fully recovers.
SWB losses following the great recession of 2007-8 appear to be slightly
smaller. In the paper, we explain that this might be because of contagion. In an
effort to investigate this further, we ﬁnd suggestive evidence that the loss in
SWB may be considerable for those individuals living in countries which had
previously experienced a credit boom.
Interestingly, we do not detect any discernible differential impacts across
socio-economic groups, suggesting that all individuals appear to be equally
affected by the crisis.
Furthermore, we found that the loss in SWB is partly explained by a ﬁscal
channel (e.g., government intervention) an economic growth channel and a
wealth channel, but interestingly the psychological loss is robust and still present
after their inclusion, i.e., it goes beyond their inclusion.
Our paper provides some of the ﬁrst robust evidence that banking crises have
far-reaching consequences and lead to major, widespread and lasting psycholog-
ical losses.
We interpret these effects as causal by showing that, conditioning on a set of
micro and macro controls and ﬁxed effects, individual’s SWB trends were very
similar in countries hit and spared by a banking crisis up to four years before
the crisis itself. This ﬁnding supports the identifying assumption – known as
the common trend assumption – that respondents living in countries that did
not experience a ﬁnancial crisis provide a valid counterfactual for individuals
in countries in crisis.
What might explain the robustness of these results?We put forward an explana-
tion by referring to the literature on uncertainty and trust and suggest that these ef-
fects may reveal a deep failure of trust, such as trust in ﬁnancial institutions or trust
in political/regulatory institutions, caused by banking crisis and picked up at psy-
chological level by our SWB variable. This is certainly a stimulating topic which
deserves further research. Unfortunately, surveys on trust at European level are
either very sporadic (The World Value Surveys include European countries but
there are considerable gaps between successive waves) or began too late (The
European Social Surveys start in 2001-2003, while the Eurobarometer includes
questions on trust in European Institutions from 1999 only). Future research needs
to focus on other World regions. This failure of trust could also be a powerful de-
terminant of Knightian uncertainty (i.e., unquantiﬁable uncertainty, as described,
for instance, by Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008).
Finally, we conjecture that these psychological losses may scar individuals,
providing an explanation for the ﬁndings in the literature that depression and eco-
nomic crisis may shape individuals’ future decisions. This result could also
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provide a plausible explanation to the ﬁndings that people born during, or
witnessed a ﬁnancial crisis, have a lower propensity to risk (Malmendier and
Tate, 2005, Malmendier and Nagel, 2011 and Malmendier et al. 2011.).
This brings us to the policy conclusion that ﬁnancial stability should be at least
as important as monetary stability.
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SUMMARY
It is known that banking crises produce large economic costs. Yet might their consequences be even more
far-reaching? We investigate an issue as yet largely unexplored and provide some of the ﬁrst evidence that
banking crises also lead to major, widespread, and lasting psychological losses. We estimate the costs of
banking crises with individual life satisfaction; we show that these extend beyond GDP declines and other
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial leakages. For the 2007-8 ﬁnancial crisis, we ﬁnd some evidence that the losses
are larger for those countries that had previously experienced a credit boom.
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